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Trust

What we hold,
and what we refuse to.

Most of this page is about data we deliberately never touch. That is the design: the smaller the blast radius, the shorter your diligence.

Data boundary

Where every field actually lives

If a row says never, it means the system has no code path that could store it — not that we have a policy against it.

PAN, track data, expiry
Encrypted inside the certified kernel to a key the acquirer holds. It crosses TapProof as an opaque blob and is never decrypted, parsed or logged.
Never
PIN / PIN block
Phase 2 only, and even then handled entirely within the certified kernel.
Never
Settlement funds
Authorisation goes to your acquirer; settlement goes to your account. There is no TapProof account in the flow.
Never
End-customer KYC documents
Onboarding runs through your process. We store the verification outcome, not the documents.
Never
Masked tail, scheme
Last four digits and card scheme, for receipts and reconciliation.
Held
RRN, auth code
The join key your reconciliation runs on.
Held
Attestation signals
Device integrity verdicts and every allow/deny decision. This is the audit trail.
Held

No fund flow

Money moves around us, never through us

There is no TapProof account anywhere in the settlement path. It is not a policy — there is no code path that could open one.

Attestation

A device earns the right to transact, every time

Acceptance on a phone somebody owns is only safe if the phone can prove what it is. PCI MPoC requires a back-end attestation and monitoring component; it is ours, and it is the part an assessor spends the most time on.

01

Play Integrity

Verified server-side on every session. MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY alone is not sufficient for payment acceptance. SafetyNet is retired and unsupported.
02

Hardware identity

Device identity is the hash of a hardware-backed keystore attestation key, StrongBox where the handset has it. It cannot be spoofed by copying a file.
03

Continuous monitoring

A four-hour heartbeat, hard-failed at twenty-four. A device that stops heart-beating stops being able to transact.
04

Fail closed

Root, unlocked bootloader, emulator, attached debugger, screen overlay, developer options, stale security patch — each blocks the session and is logged.

Proof of presence

Who took this money, and where were they standing?

This is the question every operator away from a counter eventually has to answer — to a customer, an auditor, a card scheme or a regulator.

TapProof binds the operator’s verified identity, the attested device, the location and the timestamp to the transaction itself. Not as a report generated afterwards, but as the record that was created at the moment it happened.

Every event carries a per-account sequence number and an HMAC-SHA256 signature over a timestamped body. A gap is visible. A tampered payload fails. A captured payload cannot be replayed later.

Event stream · your endpointHMAC-SHA256

Two refusals recorded. Both are evidence.

Hardware-backed keystore identity

Identity

A device that cannot lie about what it is

Enrolment generates a key inside the handset's secure hardware, StrongBox where the model has it. The device's identity is the hash of that key.

It cannot be spoofed by copying a preferences file, cannot be moved to another handset, and dies with a factory reset — which is exactly the behaviour an acquirer expects from an acceptance device.

Sector regimes

The rules our customers have to satisfy

TapProof is not a compliance product. It produces the evidence that compliance regimes ask for, and in one case enforces the rules directly.

RBI recovery conduct
Binding 1 January 2027 on regulated lenders: certified agents, antecedent verification, one day’s pre-visit notice, and no contact outside 08:00–19:00. TapProof applies all four at the moment of contact and records every refusal.
Enforced in software
Card scheme rules
Chargeback defence needs proof that a card-present transaction was genuinely card-present, taken by an authorised operator.
Evidence
Consumer disputes
Delivery and service disputes turn on whether the handover happened. Time, location and operator identity settle most of them without an investigation.
Evidence
Outsourcing oversight
Where a regulated entity uses a field workforce, it remains responsible for their conduct. An auditable record of who was authorised, and when, is the baseline.
Evidence
Data localisation
All payment data stays in India, on Indian infrastructure, and we can evidence it.
Committed

Time

Some sectors regulate when you may knock

Where they do, the window is enforced at the moment of contact rather than audited afterwards — and the refusal is written to the record with a reason code.

A platform that merely logs an out-of-hours visit has produced evidence against its customer. One that refuses it has produced evidence for them. That distinction is the entire point of building the rule into the software.

A permitted window, enforced not reported

Posture

Certification, stated honestly

We will not claim a certification we do not hold. Your risk team will check, and one overclaim ends the conversation.

PCI MPoC
The EMV kernel is licensed from an MPoC-certified vendor rather than built. TapProof holds no kernel, PIN or PAN-parsing code — deliberately, so this codebase stays outside the certification boundary.
Via licensed kernel
EMV L3 / scheme
Completed with your switch, per scheme, including NPCI C-flow for RuPay.
Joint with sponsor
Penetration testing
Independent, and required annually under MPoC once certified.
Annual
Log hygiene
A Luhn-checked scrubber runs on every log line before any transport sees it, redacting PANs, track-2 patterns and any field named pin, cvv or payload.
Enforced in code

Signed

A record that can be checked, not just read

HMAC-SHA256 over a timestamped body, sequenced per account. Tampering fails verification; a captured payload cannot be replayed at you later.

The boundary

Why we are not a payment aggregator

Under the RBI Payment Aggregator Directions, 2025, aggregating transactions where the acceptance device and payment instrument are physically proximate requires PA-P authorisation. We do not do that.

Condition 1

No fund flow

Enforced in code. Any route or payload implying a payout, settlement instruction, escrow or beneficiary is refused at the edge with HTTP 451.
Condition 2

No merchant contract

Enforced in the schema. The top-level tenant is a licensee, never a merchant — a merchant cannot exist without a licensee parent.
Condition 3

Never acquirer of record

No BIN, no scheme membership, no appearance on a cardholder’s statement.